Loss of a loved one Stress Chronic pain or medical conditions But whatever their reason for starting, once addiction sets in, the disease usually spirals more and more out of their control. How Addiction Develops For most people, the initial decision to take drugs is voluntary.
Frerks is a professor at Utrecht University and Wageningen University. Cornell University Press, Stanford University Press, In many countries, governance — the provision of security, welfare and representation — is not a prerogative of the state alone.
Besides the usual NGOs, firms and lobbies, "non-state-governance actors" have the means and ambition to provide constituencies in specific areas with security through regulating the internal use of force and offering protection from external threatswelfare through social and utility services and political representation through institutions for feedback and consultation.
Such non-state actors have intricate and often ambiguous relations with state institutions, resulting in complex and contested governance dynamics.
However, this potential has been only marginally fulfilled in the most recent English-language monographs about the Lebanese state. We do not aim to criticize books for not being something they never intended to be, and we are aware of the fact that non-state governance is not the central concern of the reviewed works.
Our observations should therefore be seen as a contribution to the academic conversation on hybrid governance rather than as a criticism of the books as such. Najem and Leenders themselves note the remarkable lack of academic analysis on the Lebanese state in the post-civil-war period.
Leenders laments the "virtual absence of the state in the study of Lebanese politics," even if there "are fierce political battles over the role of the state.
By not defining the state more deeply, one assumes it encompasses all governance, which neither does justice to Lebanese reality nor provides a solid basis for engagement with Lebanese governance actors. The Fragile State as a Default Mode Through a meticulous investigation of corruption in several public institutions, Leenders dissects the dys function of the Lebanese state.
Inspired by New Institutional Economics, he shows how Lebanese politicians systematically design, divert and circumvent policies in ways that fill their own pockets, serve their own interests and undermine state capacity and legitimacy.
Through scrupulous empirical analysis, Leenders demonstrates how ambiguous mandates and ill-defined procedures, often characterized by "permanent temporariness and exceptionality," facilitate endemic corruption by paralyzing state watchdogs and interlocking the public and private sectors.
He identifies five aspects thereof that undermine Weberian standards: He does not conceptualize "the state," which remains an ever-present, yet ephemeral, notion throughout the book.
Paradoxically, because of the porous boundaries between public and private institutions, the state might well be "all-important" in determining access to resources and opportunities: The overlap between public and private is not merely seen as undesirable, it is also seen as deviating from a specific standard.
However, this Weberian ideal does not reflect the majority of prevailing state organizations and is hardly a historical standard in Lebanon. Leenders acknowledges this, and he is right in arguing that the ideal nature of the criteria does not prevent them from shedding light on the causes of corruption in Lebanon.
But the omission of alternative views on the state, state-society relations, public authority and bureaucracy that are less traditionally Western and state-centered, is striking. Leenders sees institutional disarray as deliberately generated and pursued by politicians seeking to benefit from this.
Yet his insistence on seeing corruption as the dysfunction or failure of one system the Weberian bureaucracy obscures how corruption is also the function or success of another system.
It is that other system that needs explication. In an empirical sense, Leenders provides this, but theoretical underpinning is largely absent. Through a historical analysis of Lebanese state formation, Najem delivers a solid overview of Lebanese politico-institutional development.
However, he fails to conceptualize, theorize or define what it is he talks about when discussing "a" or "the" state; though it is the main topic of his book.
Nowhere does he elaborate on core concepts such as "society," "state," "government," "state institutions," "authorities," "civil service," "the political system" or "political order," terms seemingly used interchangeably. The state is seen as structure and actor at the same time, and it remains unclear what or who constitutes the state.
This confusion is palpable when Najem notes, for instance, that "the zuama also worked together within the state context to prevent the Lebanese state itself from becoming too strong and therefore capable of impinging on their own regional power bases.
The former two sectarian tensions and foreign penetrations appear to describe the latter state weakness: Occasional reference is made to notions such as functionality, distributional capacity and legitimacy, but these too are not defined.
At the same time, Najem takes "consociationalism" as the political system against which he evaluates the Lebanese state.
He implies that a strong state is a sovereign state free from sectarian-elite encroachment and foreign penetrationand that such state strength can, in Lebanon, be achieved through consociational democracy.
This consociational democracy, however, will only function that is, result in state strength if it fulfills the four stated prerequisites, which it does not because the state is weak.
Thus, the state is weak because the political system does not function, and the political system does not function because the state is weak. The consociational democracy notion here reinstates itself as a prescriptive policy proposition and reveals its limitations in serving as an explanatory framework.Lebanon Lebanon, a nation that once proudly called itself the Switzerland of the Middle East, is today a country in name only.
Its government controls little more than half of the nation's capital, Beirut. Drugs in Lebanon Pages: 3 Words: Facts and Official Action Cannabis has been grown in the Beak valley ever since the Roman Empire, despite the laws prohibiting it. Essay topic about drugs long creative profile writing ks3 tes describing event essay office essay about tennis zebra in english, academic english essay writing zemaching what is a blog essay satire sport is healthy essay benefits essay traffic congestion jakarta.
Music opinion essays format ielts job finding essay evaluation. Drugs in Lebanon Facts and Official Action Cannabis has been grown in the Beak valley ever since the Roman Empire, despite the laws prohibiting it.
A long-running measure by the government before the Civil War was to burn the fields before the yearly harvest.
Trials around the world have corroborated that, with examples such as Amsterdam’s, and the more radical decriminalisation of all types of drugs more than a decade ago in Portugal, has more than halved drug abuse and addiction in the tiny European country.
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